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Abstract
Given the continuous growth of illicit activities on the Internet, there is a need for
intelligent systems to identify malicious web pages. It has been shown that URL anal-
ysis is an e↵ective tool for detecting phishing, malware, and other attacks. Previous
studies have performed URL classification using a combination of lexical features,
network tra c, hosting information, and other strategies. These approaches require
time-intensive lookups which introduce significant delay in real-time systems. This
paper describes a lightweight approach for classifying malicious web pages using URL
lexical analysis alone. The goal is to explore the upper-bound of the classification
accuracy of a purely lexical approach. Another aim is to develop an approach which
could be used in a real-time system. These goal culminate in the development of a
classification system based on lexical analysis of URLs. It correctly classifies URLs
of malicious web pages with 99.1% accuracy, a 0.4% false positive rate, an F1-Score
of 98.7, and requires 0.62 milliseconds on average. This method substantially out-
performs previously published algorithms on out-of-sample data.
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Glossary
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) Specifies the location of a resource on a
network.
Natural Language Processing (NLP) A field of computer science and compu-
tational linguistics which researches the interactions between computers and human
languages.
Feature A quantified property of a phenomenon being observed.
Phishing Is a scheme designed to steal private user information.
Malware Also known as Malicious software, is designed to harm computer systems.
Lexical Is an adjective describing the relation to a vocabulary of words.
Classification is the problem of finding the category to which a data sample be-
longs based on a trained data model.
Classifier A program that implements a classification algorithm.
Classification Accuracy The number of samples that a classifier has correctly
classified out of the total number of samples.
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) An application protocol for various in-
formation systems.
IP Address, domain name, geo-location, and WHOIS is a numerical identi-
fier for a device operating in a network.
Domain Name is a identifier string which defines a realm of control on a network.
WHOIS is a protocol that is used to query databases that store users of an Internet
x
Glossary
resource, such as a domain name, or block of IP Addresses.
False Positive (FP A sample that is actually benign that was classified as mali-
cious.
True Positive (TP) A sample that is actually malicious that was classified as
malicious.
False Negative (FN) A malicious sample that has been classified as benign.
True Negative (TN) A malicious sample that has been classified as malicious.
F-Measure
F  = (1 +  
2) · precision · recall
( 2 · precision) + recall
Where precision and recall are defined respectively as:
TP
TP + FP
and
TP
TP + FN
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet provides a wide-reaching platform for fraud. It can be extremely di cult
for Internet users to be on guard for the latest scams, malware, and other malicious
activities. Therefore, there has been much study dedicated to protecting Internet
users from harm. Machine learning algorithms have been shown to be an e↵ective
way of detecting maliciousness [11]. Previous work has implemented several e↵ective
classification systems for malicious web page detection [2, 23].
Internet users have come to expect quick results: they may become impatient if
there is any extra latency in content delivery. Therefore, any classifier that is built to
protect the user from malicious content must deliver its decisions quickly. However
there is a trade-o↵ between e ciency and e↵ectiveness. We must decide how much
safety we are willing to sacrifice in order to deliver content as seamlessly as possible.
The characteristics of malicious web pages di↵er based on the type of exploitation
techniques used (e.g, phishing, drive-by-downloads, and infected adware networks).
Therefore, the more comprehensive detection schemes take longer to execute as they
have more to look for.
The reality is that the most accurate approaches for classifying malicious web
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
pages tend to take the most time. Dynamic classifiers execute the page thoroughly
to look for malicious content in the behavior of the page (e.g, honeypot clients). This
is necessary when malicious content is obscured in a sophisticated way. However, due
to the resource and time-consuming nature of this approach, it is not compatible with
the uninterrupted service that users expect. In other words, the ongoing task is to
quickly detect malicious web pages without sacrificing a high degree of accuracy [25].
The appeal of static tools are the speed at which they can classify compared
to their dynamic counterparts. Static approaches attempt to classify a web page
based on its URL and content without executing the page. As such, classification
based on static features is e cient and easily scalable. However, classifiers built to
analyze static features have limited success with highly sophisticated schemes such
as obfuscated JavaScript based drive-by-downloads [17]. Obfuscation is a technique
designed to elude static detectors. Static detection tools can be evaded when the
meaning of known malicious strings are scrambled.
Savvy Internet users can often detect, for example, phishing scams with a quick
glance at a link embedded in an email. Machine learning techniques can do the same
with a high degree of accuracy. It has been shown that URL analysis alone can
provide a means to detect malicious content [11]. With the right training a machine
learning- based system can extend this skill far beyond the capabilities of the human
eye. These systems can detect malicious characteristics that would be subtle to even
the most scrupulous human user.
Previous studies have built static classifiers that detect malicious websites using a
combination of URL lexical features, network tra c, hosting information, and other
strategies [10, 20]. These studies used lexical features with a bag-of-words approach
that yields very large feature vectors (on the order of hundreds of thousands). These
studies also made use of URL features which required hosting information to be
looked up on a remote server. The use of these lookups introduces significant latency
2
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when classifying URLs. This latency precludes the use of these approaches in a real-
time system. Though it would be possible to remedy this latency by caching the
results of these queries, any sort of comprehensive cache would be on the order of
hundreds of gigabytes and preclude their use in a lightweight application such as in
a browser extension.
Though previous work had utilized URL Lexical analysis as a component, what
was lacking was the exploration of the full potential of a purely lexical approach. This
potential could prove to be beneficial both as a component in a more comprehen-
sive system or as a tolerable substitute in applications that demanded a lightweight
and/or fast approach.
This paper presents an approach which uses an n-gram model to develop a new
lightweight classification system that adheres to the strict time-constraints required
for a real-time system. The system increases accuracy on out-of-sample testing data
while maintaining overall classification accuracy comparable to previous work [11, 10,
2, 23]. This approach uses the J48 decision tree algorithm to perform classification of
URLs using 16 features extracted from an n-gram model and 71 features from other
lexical properties. J48 is an open-source, Java implementation of the C4.5 algorithm
[6].
3
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
Since the Internet was introduced to the general public, the security of computers
on the network has been a concern. The first attack to gain widespread attention
was the Morris worm unwittingly unleashed by a Cornell graduate student in 1988
[15]. This worm infected 1 in 20 computers while reducing their computing power
to a fraction of normal capacity. Since then, the types of attacks have only grown
in scope and maliciousness. Because of this growth, Cybersecurity has become an
important field of research and the resultant anti-virus software has become a critical
part of most computing environments.
As industries have moved many vital services on to the Internet, the breadth of
the Internet as well as its number of subscribers have grown exponentially. Due to
the naivet of many Internet users, malicious web pages have been an e↵ective tool
for pilfering money and private information. These web pages commonly contain
two types of attack schemes: phishing and the distribution of malicious software.
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The content of Phishing web pages usually mimics that of popular legitimate web
pages. These web pages are usually visited by users who receive seemingly legitimate
emails with links that obscure their fraudulent destinations. When users visit, for
example, a website which imitates that of a bank’s they will enter their usernames
and passwords when prompted to do so. Thus the user surrenders the access to their
bank account (and perhaps more since many people use the same usernames and
passwords for many di↵erent services).
Websites that distribute malware will often display desirable content while down-
loading software to the user’s system in the background. Users also unintentionally
infect their computers by downloading software which they believe to be legitimate.
There are many types of malware that perform various functions. A common malady
is for the infected computer to become part of a botnet. Botnets are made up of an
army of infected computers which are then able to further spread malware or a host
of other insidious activities.
Due to the large number of malicious web pages infecting the Internet, there
have been ongoing e↵orts to develop methods to identify those sites which should be
avoided.
2.2 Previous Work
Historically, the most widely adopted method for identifying malicious web pages
has been the construction of blacklists such as the Google Safebrowsing API. These
blacklists are constructed by reporting web sites after they have already successfully
executed their attacks any number of times. However, blacklists can quickly become
outdated as scammers tend to obtain and abandon domains rapidly.
Blacklists have shown to be weak in the zero hour of a phishing campaign [19],
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since they can take hours to update. Numerous machines may potentially be infected
in the meantime. Extracting machine learning features from blacklist features have
also been shown to be less e↵ective than features extracted by URL lexical analysis
[11].
Training a classifier to detect phishing attacks has been subject to numerous
studies. One approach has been to combine host-features with URL lexical analysis
to form a static classifier [11, 20, 23, 2]. Host-based feature sets include IP address,
domain name, geo-location, and WHOIS properties.
Blum et al. [1] developed an online confidence weighted classification model with
URL lexical features alone. This model di↵ers from ours in that it uses a much larger
binary bag-of-words approach that yields vectors of 369,585 features. This work was
largely based on Ma et al. [12] with the major di↵erence being the absence of host
based features.
Le, Markopoulou, and Faloutsos [10] studied the e↵ectiveness of using only lexical
features vs. combining them with additional features. They also researched the
di↵erence between batch classifiers and online learning classifiers in this problem
space.
Canali et al. [2], created Prophiler, a static classifier which acts as a filter for a
dynamic classifier. Prophiler is designed to filter the majority of benign pages while
maintaining its priority of low false negatives. This method reduces the computa-
tional load on a subsequent honey-client.
Xu et al. [25] Implemented a cross-layer approach wherein corresponding network
layer data was utilized for feature extraction. Their goal was to add network data
to extend the accuracy of a static analysis. They obtain speeds of 4.9 seconds to
extract the features and classify previously unseen URLs.
Thomas et al. [20], developed Monarch, a real-time URL classification system
6
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which classifies web pages using features from host information, the URL, javascript
events, HTTP header information, plugin-usage, redirects, HTML tags, DNS infor-
mation, geo-location information, routing data, page links, and pop-up windows.
Their vectors contain 50 million distinct features. This system was designed to clas-
sify 15 million URLs a day. Monarch achieves an overall classifcation accuracy of
91% and takes 5.54 seconds to classify a single URL on average.
With the exception of Thomas et al. [20] and Le, Markopoulou, and Faloutsos[10],
all of the previous work focuses on either classifying malware or phishing, but not
both. No previous work has focused on a system for a lightweight real-time applica-
tion and none have attempted a language model other than bag-of-words.
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Approach
3.1 Overview
The general approach is explained first, followed by discussions on the features uti-
lized, the data collected, and selection of the J48 algorithm for classification.
The goal of this study was to explore how quickly and accurately malicious web
pages could be classified using only their associated URLs. This minimal approach
leads to the fastest possible classification time since, unlike most other approaches,
all the features are extracted from the characters of the URL and not by visiting the
web page itself. Therefore we collected URLs from blacklisted and trusted websites,
labeling them malicious and benign respectively.
We collected two kinds of malicious URLs: phishing and malware. Phishing
URLs, in order to collect private information, are designed to lure users into clicking
on links that lead to fraudulent web pages. Sites that contain malware (malicious
software) seek to infect the user’s system by downloading and executing harmful
programs–users are often infected without realizing it.
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Malicious content has been detected by analyzing static components of web pages
as well as the dynamically executed content. The more e cient static methods often
include the collection HTTP header information, HTML tags and host-based features
at classification time. We chose not to extract any information beyond the URL of the
web page. While this additional information would likely yield higher classification
accuracy [10], by the eliminating the collection of all features found on the page itself,
the classification time is greatly reduced.
Furthermore, most previous work all relied on information which required lookups
of publicly available information such as WHOIS and geolocation. Due to the lookups
required to obtain these features, these approaches require a minimum of a few sec-
onds to classify a single URL. Further complicating this problem is that WHOIS
servers limit the number of requests over a given time period. A possible solution to
this problem could be to store the lookup information in a local database. However
this local database would need to be on the order of 100 gigabytes and, therefore,
preclude the use of the system in a lightweight application such as a browser exten-
sion.
As a baseline we implemented a bag-of-words model based on previous work
without utilizing any time-consuming components. Our approach utilizes an n-gram
language model which improved on the performance of the bag-of-words model when
classifying out-of-sample data. While modeling URLs with an n-gram approach has
been done [9], this method had not, to our knowledge, been been previously applied
to malicious URL detection.
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3.1.1 Modeling the Language of URLs
Standard Language Models
The goal of a language model is to assign a probability to any string of a particu-
lar language. A good language model will assign high probabilities to common and
grammatical strings while assigning low probabilities to uncommon and ungram-
matical strings. Building on this concept we attempted to construct a model of the
language of benign URLs. A standard language model would calculate the proba-
bility of the occurrence of a given benign URL. However, we calculate what we call
the similarity value of a given URL. The similarity value of a URL measures how
closely its properties are related to a URL in the benign set (this concept is further
explained in the n-gram section).
N-gram Models
A common method when constructing language models is to parse N-sized grams of
the dataset, where N is an integer. The grams can be words, phonemes, syllables, or
letters. N-grams are built using Markov chains. Markov chains make the assumption
that the probability associated with any event depends only on the probability of the
events directly preceding it. This concept is called the independence assumption. A
first order Markov chain assumes that the probability for the occurrence of a given
gram is conditioned only by the preceding gram. A second-order chain calculates
the probability based on the preceding two grams (in this case the previous state
is defined as the preceding two grams). These chains are referred to as bigrams
and trigrams. We used n-gram models to calculate the probability of a sequence of
characters occurring in a URL. Much research has proven this model to be e↵ective
in the task of language modeling and di cult to improve on [8].
10
Chapter 3. Approach
Bag-Of-Words Model
As a baseline we followed previous studies [11, 1, 10, 20] by building a binary bag-
of-words model which parses the URL into tokens which are unique in terms of
their content and location. The bag-of-words is a set that contains every single
unique token in the training data. Feature vectors contain an element representing
each token in the bag. If a given URL contains a token found in the bag, the
corresponding element in the feature vector is given the value of 1. This creates
highly sparse vectors, containing all zeros except for a few ones which represent
the tokens of the given URL and any other standard lexical features utilized. On
average our training data contained 122,000 binary features when using the bag-of-
words model (the variability in the number of features was due to di↵erent data sets
being used for each the tests).
3.1.2 Features
We implemented and expanded upon features based on the previous work of Ma et
al.[11] and Whittaker, Ryner, and Nazif [21].
Phishing URLs, tend to contain a lot of key words and symbols out of place since
they are designed to deceive users. For example, it is common to see trusted brand
names such as “paypal” or “google” distributed throughout a phishing URL. In order
to capture this observation we created a feature which performs similarity checks on
common domain names, another feature searches for any brand names that are out
of place.
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Figure 3.1: URL Components
URL Processing
Following Blum et al. [1], we separated the URL into three sections. Unlike Blum et
al., we chose to separate the URL into hostname, path, and parameter components
(see Figure 3.1). Each component was then further separated into tokens. Hostname
tokens are separated by dots, path tokens by slashes, and parameter tokens by ques-
tion marks. Within each section we further tokenized strings using the delimiters
specified in Ma et al.[11], namely ‘/’ , ‘?’ , ‘.’ , ‘=’, ‘-’ and ‘ ’.
We separated the URL into component parts in order to preserve the context of
their tokens. A feature will yield a di↵erent value when extracted from the hostname,
than the same feature in the path. For example, the average number of dots will
be 2 or 3 in a hostname, while often 0 in the path. So if the path contained an
number of dots, it would be seen as unusual. We calculated nearly all features on all
three sections of the URL as well as the entire URL. Though we implemented many
of the features on the entire URL as well as the subsections we were careful not to
introduce any feature redundancies.
In total we developed 87 features, which are categorized into five groups: n-grams,
Lengths, Counts, Binaries, and Ratios.
Features Extracted from N-gram Models
In our analysis we implemented bigrams, trigrams and fourgrams. We also calculated
a unigram probability which is context-independent. We created our n-gram models
12
Chapter 3. Approach
for the benign training data only. This was done based on the hypothesis that
benign URLs are drawn from a smaller set than the URLs of malicious websites.
Therefore there is a higher degree of variability in the characteristics of malicious
URLs. Rather than having to capture all of this variability in the training set, the
system would be better able to di↵erentiate malicious URLs since their grams would
not be characterized by the n-gram models. This hypothesis was confirmed by testing
the system with inclusion of the malicious URLs in the models. These tests yielded
lower classification accuracies.
To calculate any given n-gram, we divided each URL of the benign set into
strings of a particular size. More specifically, a unigram model maps single char-
acters whereas a bigram model maps two consecutive characters (e.g: ‘i’ and ‘it’
respectively). The unigram model does not implement Markov chains, it calculates
probability based on the frequency distribution of single character grams in the data
set, the bigram, trigram, and fourgram models implement 1st, 2nd, and third order
Markov chains.
In general, we define   as an gram string of length L (where L = 1, specifies
a unigram model, L = 2 specifies a bigram model, and so on), we generate an n-
gram model to contain all unique occurrences of strings of size L for a given section.
Therefore the n-gram map of our training data is represented by the set:
  = { L1 ,  L2 ,  L3 , . . . ,  Lm}
where each  i is a unique n-gram and m is the total number of unique L-sized grams
found in the data. Let ✓ be the total number of occurrences of each   in the entire
data set D.
We now have a set ⇥ where:
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⇥ = {✓L1 , ✓L2 , ✓L3 , . . . , ✓Lm}
Where each ✓i represents the number of occurrences of its corresponding  i.
Once we have a map ⇥ we can calculate the probability ⇢i for any given ✓i. We
calculate the unigram frequency by dividing the total occurrences of   by the sum
of all ✓L=1. To calculate a bigram probability of a given  i occurring in any URL in
D we take the quotient of two grams. Where the numerator is the given bigram and
the denominator is the unigram which makes up the first half of that bigram. The
general equation for any ⇢i is given here
⇢i =
8>>>><>>>>:
✓LiPm
i=1 ✓
L
i
if L = 1
✓Li
✓L 1i
if L > 1
Given any  L we calculate its probability by conditioning it with the  L 1 sequence
which is contained within it. For example, the probability of a string “ate” depends
entirely on the probability of string “at”. In other words, we calculate the probability
of “ate” occurring, given that we know “at” has already occurred.
We can now represent the probability of a single occurrence of any  i with the
set:
P = {⇢L1 , ⇢L2 , ⇢L3 , . . . , ⇢Lm}
We calculated our n-gram models using the benign portion of the data set only.
The intuition is that if we model probabilities on only one class, the other class
will have lower values for the feature, which will aid the classifier in its decision.
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By modeling on the benign portion of the data we capture two key insights. First,
the set of benign URLs changes at slower rate than the set of malicious URLs.
Second, malicious data will have very low values for these features, this increases the
classifier’s performance on out-of-sample data (see table 4.2).
For each test we built the n-gram model dynamically based on the samples in the
training data for that given test. This way the model contained no prior information
on the testing data.
In order to assign real feature values, each URL was parsed into segments of size
L. We then looked up each value of ⇢Li and summed them all together. If a value
was not found in PL, the lookup table, we simply added 0. After summing all ⇢Li we
divided by total number of   present in the URL, this normalizes the n-gram feature
value by the length of the URL.
These features are not probabilistic representations of the URL. A probabilistic
feature would would have summed all log-probabilities of  Li . We tested this ap-
proach. However, we achieved higher results with summation of the probabilities of
 .
Our choice of probability addition yields the union of the probabilities for all  i:
Similarity(URL) =
⇢1 [ ⇢2 [ . . . [ ⇢m
Length(URL)
Summation, or what we will call similarity, resulted in higher classification accu-
racy (see Table 4.5).
Besides those based on the N-gram models, the rest of our feature set includes:
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Length
We implemented a total of 10 length features. These features are the length of the:
hostname, first-directory, URL, path, parameters, top-level-domain, and second-level
domain. We also calculated the longest-token in host, path, parameter and URL.
Counting Features
These features count occurrences of a sequence or character. Some examples of
character counts are the number of: delimiters,‘-’, ‘@’, ‘?’, ‘.’, ‘=’, ‘%’, ‘http’, ‘www’,
digits, numbers, letters, tokens, non-alpha numeric, and directories. We implemented
a total of 29 count features.
Pattern Features
Pattern features look for specific patterns within the URL and count occurrences
of the pattern. Pattern counts were performed all all three subsections of the URL
as well as the entire URL. Some examples are: case changes, most consecutive oc-
currences of a character, most frequent token, similarity to blacklist words, blacklist
word count. Our list of blacklist words was drawn from Garera et al. [5]. We
implemented a total of 15 pattern features.
Binary Features
Binary features are the following: ‘.com’ out of place, IP address for a hostname,
similarity to alexa-top-10 domains, and the presence of an alexa top-10 domain out
of place. We used the DamerauLevenshtein algorithm to check the edit distance in
order to detect phishing attacks that use domain squatting (e.g. gooogle.com). We
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checked distances for the top-10 alexa domains. Domain-out-of-place determines if a
domain word from the Alexa top-ten list is not in its correct position. For example
the URL www.malicious.com/www.google.com shows google.com (the number one
Alexa site as of this writing), as out of place.
Ratio Features
Ratio features calculate the ratio between di↵erent types of characters or tokens.
Some examples are: vowel / consonant ratio, digit / letter ratio, average length of
tokens for each subsection and the entire URL. There are a total of 12 ratio features.
We implemented a total of 87 features.
3.1.3 Data Sets
We began by collecting the same training data as Ma et al. [11]. We then sought out
further sources of data in an attempt to build a more comprehensive training set.
The training data was drawn from six web sites: Phishtank.org, Openphish.com, mal-
waredomainlist.org, malwaredomains.org, DMOZ.org, and Alexa.com. The training
data set contains a total of 68,031 malicious and 122,550 benign URLs.
Malicious Data Collection
Phishing data was drawn from Phishtank.com and OpenPhish.com. Both web sites
contain lists of phishing URLs. The Phishtank data is verified by human users.
OpenPhish data is confirmed as phishing by autonomous algorithms. Since it was
launched in June 2014, none of the literature that we studied had access to this data.
The URLs from websites dispensing malware were drawn from lists found on
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malwaredomainlist.com and malwaredomains.com. These block lists provide only
domain names. Therefore we configured a web crawler to extract links from web
pages contained in these inventories of Malware domains. From this set, we removed
any URLs which pointed to domains outside the block lists since malicious pages
may contain links to trusted domains.
Benign Data Collection
To collect the benign data set, we configured a crawler to collect links from the
DMOZ.org directory and the Alexa.com top 1000 domains. DMOZ is a directory of
the entire Internet which is manually managed. DMOZ links are posted by approved
human editors. Alexa.com ranks websites based on tra c. As with previous studies
[3, 17], we assumed the most highly tra cked websites to be the most highly scru-
tinized, and therefore, safe. However, since pornographic sites tend to be sources
of malware, and yet highly tra cked, we manually removed any site whose domain
name suggested the presence of pornography.
Table 3.1: Training Data
Source URLs Subset Training Set
Alexa 105,806 Benign
122,550
Benign
122,550
DMOZ 16,744
Phishtank 17,531 Phishing
25,388OpenPhish 7,857
Malicious
68,031
MalwareDomains 39,230 Malware
42,643MalwareDomainList 3,413
Finally, we cross-referenced the domains from the malicious and benign sets, if
any domain was present in both sets, we removed them entirely from our training
data. This became necessary since a highly tra cked Chinese website, qq.com, which
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is ranked in the Alexa top 1000, had been reported as distributing malware on one
of the block lists (URLs from qq.com were found in and removed from both of our
benign and malicious data sets). A breakdown of the whole dataset can be seen in
Table 3.1.
Data Analysis
Table 3.2 shows that the average values for length and count attributes tend to be
largest for phishing URLs, and smallest for malware URLs. Phishing and Benign
URLs are designed to attract users: much thought is put into the domain and path
tokens. Malware URLs, on the other hand, are often only seen after the user has
been redirected from other pages: their utility is not in the attraction of user clicks.
URL Characterizations
Attribute Benign Malware Phishing
Length 64.06 58.94 101.97
Delimiter Count 6.13 5.68 8.30
Digit / Letter Ratio 0.13 0.15 0.21
Number of Dashes 1.40 1.13 1.16
Count of Blacklist
Words
0.13 0.16 0.95
Number of Non-Alpha-
numeric Characters
47.27 43.05 83.75
Length of Parameter 15.19 10.89 21.96
Digit Count in Host 0.34 0.55 1.06
Non-Alphanumeric
Count in HostName
13.14 14.14 20.64
Length of 1st directory 8.50 10.09 11.21
Vowel / Consonant
Ratio in Hostname
0.45 0.39 0.55
Table 3.2: Examples of Average Feature Values
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3.1.4 Classification Algorithms
In this study we compared the e↵ectiveness of several classification methods with
our data and feature sets.
Baseline
As a baseline for comparison we built a linear classifier using regularized logistic
regression. Logistic regression is a parametric model for binary classification where
examples are classified by their distance from a decision boundary. We implemented
L1 regularized logistic regression model from the LibLinear package as was done by
Ma et al.[11]. The methodology was to ensure that our system performed with higher
accuracy than previous studies with our data set.
N-gram Based System
For the implementation of the classifier based on n-gram modeling we used the
J48 algorithm (an implementation of the C4.5 decision tree). J48 is one of many
classification algorithms available in the popular Weka machine learning suite[7]. We
chose J48 due to its reputation of success in this domain [24] and after evaluating
its performance in comparison to Bayesian Logistic Regression, Logistic Regression,
Naive Bayes, and K-Nearest Neighbors classifiers.
Comparison of Algorithms
In order to evaluate performance of each algorithm, we compared their overall accu-
racy and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
A classifier’s accuracy is not the only necessary metric to evaluate its performance.
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The ambiguity lies in the fact that classification accuracy may not have equal mis-
classification costs: an accuracy of 98% tells nothing about the false positive and
negative rates. In fact, in a real-world deployment of any classifier, it is often true
that the error rate of one class of data comes at a higher cost than misclassifying
other types of data.
Table 3.3: ROC Area Under Curve Values
Classifier AUC
NaiveBayes 91.1
BayesianLogisticRegression 92.8
LogisticRegression 98.7
Knn 99.0
J48 99.3
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An ROC curve shows the false-positive and false-negative rates on the X and Y axes
respectively. Therefore, the curve represents the predictive quality of the classifier
independent of error costs (and class imbalance in the training data) [16]. In order
to choose our classifier we examined the ROC area under the curve value (AUC)
and Accuracy rate of each type of classifier. Table 3.3 shows J48 outperforming its
counterparts in AUC of the ROC. Furthermore, the J48-based system achieved the
highest overall classification accuracy for the n-gram model.
3.1.5 The J48 Algorithm
J48, a top-down single decision tree, is a recursive algorithm which seeks to best
divide the data based on its attributes. It creates child nodes to split the data
based on the highest value of either the information gain or gain ratio of the given
attributes. The selection of splitting criterion is a free parameter choice. Both during
and after the construction of the tree J48 implements pruning features in order to
avoid overfitting the training data.
Derivation of J48
Let T be the the set of choices of size S at a particular node. Then the information
gain is defined as:
gain = info(T ) 
SX
i=1
|Ti|
|T | · info(Ti)
where info(T ) is the entropy function:
info(T ) =  
nX
j=1
freq(Cj, T )
|T | · log2(
freq(Cj, T )
|T | )
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where n is the number of data classes, and Cj is a particular class [18].
Choosing the information gain equation minimizes the entropy found in the chil-
dren of the split. However, this tends to reward splits which contain large numbers
of remaining samples. Information gain ratio, the default setting for J48, divides the
information gain by the information provided by the children of the split [22]:
Split(T ) =  
SX
i=1
|Ti|
|T | · log2(
|Ti|
|T | )
This process continues until J48 hits one of its base cases which are:
1. All remaining samples belong to the same class.
2. Information gain ratio is zero for all features.
3. A class value is seen for the first time.
J48 Feature Selection
A feature will only be used if and when it is the choice which provides the highest
information gain in determining the class of a data vector. This indicates the rele-
vancy of a given feature: If a feature does not provide the best split of the data at
any of the nodes in the tree, it is never used.
3.1.6 E↵ectiveness Metrics for Features
As each feature was implemented, we compared the e↵ectiveness of the classifier to
its previous iteration using the following e↵ectiveness metrics: F1-score, accuracy,
false-negative rate (FNR), and false-positive rate (FPR). Accuracy was measured on
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the entire data set, whereas the F1-score, FNR, and FPR are defined from the point-
of-view of the malicious data. Therefore, accuracy is simply the percentage URLs
that are correctly classified, FPR rate is the percentage of benign URLs classified as
malicious, and FNR rate is the percentage of malicious URLs classified as benign.
F-Score Equation
The F-score is defined as:
F  = (1 +  
2) · precision · recall
( 2 · precision) + recall
Where precision and recall are defined respectively as:
TP
TP + FP
and
TP
TP + FN
24
Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Results Compared to Previous Work
We implemented a bag-of-words model with L1 logistic regression (LR) in order
to have a baseline comparison with the most e↵ective previous work. The overall
classification results were quite similar as seen in Table 4.1. However Table 4.2 shows
that the J48 model outperforms LR-based model when testing on out-of-sample data.
Table 4.1: Classifier Performance, 10-Fold Cross Validation on Training Set Size
131,520.
Accuracy F1-Score FPR FNR
J48 99.1 98.9 1.7% 0.4%
LR 99.1 98.7 1.7% .5%
4.1.1 Similarities With Previous Work
Table 4.1 shows the results of both models are virtually identical tested with 10-
fold cross validation using a 1:1 ratio of benign to malicious URLs on the entire
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training data. FPR and FNR are the malicious false positive and false negative rates
respectively. Both classifiers take less than one millisecond to classify a URL. All
tests were run on a computer with a 1.8 GHz Intel i5 processor and 8GB of memory.
4.1.2 Di↵erences from Previous Work
The tests shown in Table 4.2 demonstrate that our n-gram model achieves with
higher accuracy on out-of-sample malicious URLs then the previous work. The data
in Table 4.2 is the resultant malicious True Positive Rate (TPR) when training
on one source of malicious data set while testing on another. MDomains refers
to data drawn from the source MalwareDomains.com, MDList is data drawn from
MalwaredomainList.com, OpenPhish is drawn from Openphish.com and PhishTank
from phishtank.com.
Table 4.2: Training with one malicious data set, while testing with another. True
Positive Rate
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4.1.3 Discussion of Out-of-sample Data Test
By training on one source of data and testing against the other, the classifier’s
performance on out-of-sample data is tested. J48 performs with higher accuracy in
the majority of cases. LR has a lower TPR for a number of tests. Overall these
tests show that the n-gram model with J48 generalizes to new data with higher
accuracy than bag-of-words with LR. This test is atypical in that a classifier would
not normally be expected to perform well on a data type that it has never seen
before. However, since the J48-based system uses language models that are only
based on benign websites, anything that does not “look” like a benign URL is likely
to be classified as malicious.
The landscape of malicious URLs changes rapidly since attackers obtain and
abandon domains rapidly to avoid detection. Whereas, the set of benign URLs
changes very slowly in comparison since brand names are meticulously cultivated
over time (e.g, google.com or facebook.com). Therefore, if the n-gram language
models are comprehensively built to include the large majority of benign websites,
this system will be well equipped to detect fly-by-night malicious operators. Since,
as Table 4.2 shows, it performs well in classifying malicious data that looks nothing
like anything it has ever encountered.
Table 4.3 shows the confusion matrix for the J48 model. In general we see that
false positives and negatives were quite even.
Table 4.3: Confusion Matrix : P = predicted value, R = real value.
Malicious - P Benign - P
Malicious-R 65316 444
Benign-R 452 65333
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4.1.4 Feature E↵ectiveness
Table 4.4 shows the top 25 features ranked by information gain ratio for the entire
training data. These scores are calculated for the entire training data which is the
same calculation that J48 makes at the root of the tree: before it has made any splits
of the data. Even though some features may provide little information at the top
of the tree, J48 re-calculates the information gain ratio before the creation of each
node. Thus some of the features that tank lower at the root, they provide higher
information gain lower in the tree when the data sets are highly split.
In order to quantify the e↵ectiveness of each feature type, we trained and tested
the classifier with each feature group separately: count, length, binary, ratio, n-gram,
and pattern. The results are shown in Figure 4.1. The n-gram group has the highest
accuracy of 98.23% which correlates with Table 4.4.
N-Gram Similarity Features
Our first attempt at utilizing the n-gram model was to sum the log-probabilities
of the n-grams. However, the classification accuracy increased when these features
were calculated using the summation of the probabilities themselves. We call this
feature the similarity value of a URL. In summary: rather than calculating the
probability that a given URL belongs to the benign set, this feature represents the
similarity of the test URLs to the URLs in the benign set. This is why the classifier
is highly e↵ective in classifying malicious data that is unlike any that it has previous
encountered (Table 4.2).
Table 4.5 shows the results of the J48 trained with the n-gram model using both
the similarity and a probability approach. When calculating the probability value
we used log probabilities to avoid underflow.
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Figure 4.1: Performance of J48 Classifier When Trained and Tested on Individual
Feature Categories.
4.1.5 Tuning
It is possible to tune the classifier to focus on false positives or false negatives. This
is done by adjusting the ratio of benign to malicious samples in the training data.
An example application of tuning would be the integration of the classifier with a
firewall. An administrator might desire to tune the classifier to keep false positives
low in order to reduce complaints about blocked sites. Otherwise, if it is desired to
keep false negatives low in order to reduce the spam and viruses in the network, this
could be done as well. Table 4.6 shows tuning results for the J48 classifier. As the
number of malicious samples is increased the false negative rate is decreased.
29
Chapter 4. Results
4.1.6 Dataset Validation
Since many of our URLs come from the same domains, there are duplicate portions
contained in multiple URLs. If there are several URLs in the training set that contain
identical tokens to URLs in the testing set, this could overweight the decision tree
toward certain features.
In order to test against this we created a set of URLs where all domains were
unique. This increased the variation between data samples. The results of this test
are shown in Table 4.7. It is notable that the two models di↵er significantly in their
FPR and FNR rates. This could be a deciding factor on which method to implement.
The lowered accuracy of both classifiers can be accounted for in the reduced training
size (12,000 URLs). If a larger training set of unique domains was constructed (on
the order of 120k), the accuracy of both classifiers would improve.
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Table 4.4: Features Ranked by Information Gain Ratio on the Training Data
Rank Feature Info Gain Ratio
1 HostName QuadGram 0.8544122
2 HostName TriGram 0.7644311
3 HostName BiGram 0.7359932
4 HostName UniGram 0.7325711
5 URL QuadGram 0.3948905
6 Path QuadGram 0.1502406
7 Parameters QuadGram 0.145088
8 URL TriGram 0.1243128
9 Vowel/Consonant Hostname 0.1225869
10 Path TriGram 0.1151544
11 LongestToken Hostname 0.1113489
12 AverageLengthOfTokens Hostname 0.1051401
13 Path BiGram 0.1011293
14 Path UniGram 0.0905633
15 Length Hostname 0.0846729
16 Parameters TriGram 0.081808
17 Length 2LD 0.0795415
18 LongestToken URL 0.0763964
19 LongestToken Path 0.0739061
20 Digit/Letter Path 0.072608
21 AverageLengthOfTokens Path 0.0672172
22 AverageLengthOfTokens URL 0.0662559
23 Length URL 0.0606642
24 Number NonAlphaChars URL 0.0604375
25 Length Path 0.0568101
Table 4.5: J48 N-Gram model: Training on Similarity Value Features vs Probability
Value Features
Accuracy F1-Score FPR FNR
Probability 96.489 96.5 0.035 0.035
Similarity 99.01 99 0.012 0.006
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Table 4.6: Classification tuning results. Total Training Samples : 65,679
Ben: Mal Acc F1-Score FPR FNR
3 : 1 98.96% 99.0 1.0% 1.1%
1 : 1 98.8% 98.9 1.3% 0.8%
1 : 3 97.7% 97.8 3.3% 0.4%
Table 4.7: Test with Unique Domain Names, Training Size: 12,000 URLS
classifier Acc F1Score FPR FNR
J48 94.76 94.7 9.8 1.7
LR 96.3 96.79 4.7 3.8
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Evasion
A fundamental flaw in the study of malicious website classification is that attackers
have access to most of the same data that researchers use to train detection systems
[24]. Therefore, attackers can design their attacks to evade detection. A purely
lexical approach relies on common characteristics of malicious URLs in order to
di↵erentiate them from benign URLs. If an attacker were to manipulate their URLs
to avoid features that detection algorithms use to detect maliciousness, it is possible
to evade detection. However, there could be cost associated with manipulating these
features depending on the intended use of a particular URL.
5.1 Evading detection with phishing URLs
URLs used for phishing attacks are designed to lure a human user into believing
that a link is legitimate. For example, familiar brand names such as “google” or
“facebook” are commonly distributed throughout the URL. Therefore, in order to
detect these URLs it is useful to look for an overuse of tokens that would normally be
associated with legitimate websites. Another strategy is to determine whether these
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seemingly legitimate tokens are out of place (e.g. facebook.com should be classified
as legitimate, whereas facebook.xyz.com should be classified as malicious). In order
to evade this particular feature, attackers would need to remove the brand name
tokens. However, the removal of these tokens would reduce the likelihood of fooling
the user. Thus by attempting to avoid detection through this route the attackers
would also be lowering the e↵ectiveness of their attack.
5.2 Evading detection with malware URLs
Unlike phishing URLs, Malware URLs are not always designed to fool users. These
URLs are often landed on after redirection from other domains. Therefore, the
lexicon of malware URLs is less intrinsic to the attack itself. At the present time,
our charactization of malware URLs seems to suggest that attackers put very little
thought into the tokens seen in URLs leading to malware. However it is clear that
malware URLs do not currently look like regular URLs, as long as this remains true,
the n-gram Model will detect all things that are not benign.
5.3 Evading Detection with Shortened URLs
URL shortening services are becoming increasingly popular both with attackers and
the general public[14]. When a user clicks on a shortened URL, it redirects to the
full length URL of the page. URL Lexical analysis designed to measure the features
of a full length URL only. Currently, our system rejects shortened URLs.
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5.4 Strength of n-gram Modeling
The landscape of malicious URLs changes rapidly since attackers obtain and abandon
domains rapidly to avoid detection. Whereas, the set of benign URLs changes very
slowly in comparison since brand names are meticulously cultivated over time (e.g,
google.com or facebook.com). Many of the features in our system are based on n-
gram models of of the most common benign URLs. This allows the system to assign
a similarity value to the likelihood that a URL is benign based on the number of
legitimate tokens that are present. In order to evade detection, the characteristics
of Malicious URLs will continue to change. However, since the characteristics of
malicious URLs, will always di↵er from benign URLs by some degree of similarity,
given regular retraining, the n-gram models will be able to detect URLs that are
dissimilar from benign URLs.
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Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Summary
In this paper we have presented a novel, lightweight approach for classifying malicious
URLs. Once built, the classifier can process and classify a URL with an average speed
of 0.627 milliseconds and an accuracy of 99.1%. Unlike previous work, this level of
accuracy is achieved without time-consuming lookups and is capable of detecting
two di↵erent types of malicious URLs. This is important as we envision our classifier
being integrated with an existing small-scale security system such as a firewall or
browser extension. To test production readiness we would generate network tra c
and measure the performance of the system in handling a high volume of data.
Though Previous work had utilized URL Lexical analysis as a component, what
was lacking was the exploration of the full potential of a purely lexical approach. This
potential could prove to be beneficial both as a component in a more comprehen-
sive system or as a tolerable substitute in applications that demanded a lightweight
and/or fast approach.
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6.2 Drawbacks
Though the our classifier performs at a high level in its niche, it is not without its
share of limitations. URL shortening services are becoming increasingly popular both
with attackers and the general public. When a user clicks on a shortened URL, it
redirects to the full length URL of the page. Our system is designed to measure the
features of a full length URL only. Currently, our system rejects shortened URLs.
We would ideally add a component of our system that would follow the shortened
URL and pull for classification the URL that it refers to.
6.3 Future Work
In the future we would also like to add a component to the system that performs
detection of domain names that were created by Digitally Generated Algorithms
(DGA) since a DGA domain name suggests the presence of malicious activity such
as the presence of a botnet.
The characteristics of malicious web pages and URLs will continue to evolve. As
with any security system, this one will need to keep up with the latest trends. To
do this, there is need for the implementation a component of the system that would
regularly retrain the classifier with the latest benign data. Though the set of highly
tra cked benign websites does not change quickly compared to malicious websites,
regular retraining will be necessary.
37
References
[1] A. Blum, B. Wardman, T. Solorio, and G. Warner. Lexical feature based phish-
ing url detection using online learning. In the 3rd Workshop on Artificial Intel-
ligence and Security, pages 54–60, 2010.
[2] D. Canali, M. Cova, G. Vigna, and C. Krugel. Prophiler: A fast filter for the
large-scale detection of malicious web pages. In Proceedings of the International
World Wide Web Conference, pages 197–206, March 2011.
[3] Birhanu Eshete, Adolfo Villafiorita, and Komminist Weldemariam. Binspect:
Holistic analysis and detection of malicious web pages. Security and Privacy in
Communication Networks, pages 149–166, 2013.
[4] Rong-En Fan, Kai-Wei Chang, Cho-Jui Hsieh, Xiang-Rui Wang, and Chih-Jen
Lin. LIBLINEAR: A library for large linear classification. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 9:1871–1874, 2008.
[5] Sujata Garera, Niels Provos, Monica Chew, and Aviel D Rubin. A framework
for detection and measurement of phishing attacks. In Proceedings of the 2007
ACM workshop on Recurring malcode, pages 1–8. ACM, 2007.
[6] Mark Hall, Eibe Frank, Geo↵rey Holmes, Bernhard Pfahringer, Peter Reute-
mann, and Ian H. Witten. The weka data mining software: An update. SIGKDD
Explor. Newsl., 11(1):10–18, November 2009.
[7] Mark Hall, Eibe Frank, Geo↵rey Holmes, Bernhard Pfahringer, Peter Reute-
mann, and Ian H Witten. The weka data mining software: an update. ACM
SIGKDD explorations newsletter, 11(1):10–18, 2009.
[8] Fred Jelinek. Up from trigrams. Eurospeech, 1991.
[9] Min-Yen Kan and Hoang Oanh Nguyen Thi. Fast webpage classification us-
ing url features. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on
Information and knowledge management, pages 325–326. ACM, 2005.
38
References
[10] A. Le, A. Markopoulou, and M. Faloutsos. Phishdef: Url names say it all. In
Infocom, pages 191–195, 2010.
[11] J. Ma, L. K. Saul, S. Savage, and G. M. Voelker. Beyond blacklists: Learning to
detect malicious web sites from suspicious urls. In Proceedings of the SIGKDD
Conference, pages 1245–1254, 2009a.
[12] J. Ma, L. K. Saul, S. Savage, and G. M. Voelker. Identifying suspicious urls:
An application of large-scale online learning. In The International Conference
on Machine Learning (ICML)., pages 681–688, 2009b.
[13] D Kevin McGrath and Minaxi Gupta. Behind phishing: An examination of
phisher modi operandi. LEET, 8:4, 2008.
[14] Alexander Neumann, Johannes Barnickel, and Ulrike Meyer. Security and pri-
vacy implications of url shortening services. In Proceedings of the Workshop on
Web 2.0 Security and Privacy, 2010.
[15] Hilarie Orman. The morris worm: a fifteen-year perspective. IEEE Security &
Privacy, 1(5):35–43, 2003.
[16] F. J. Provost, T. Fawcett, and R. Kohavi. In The case against accuracy estima-
tion for comparing induction algorithms, pages 445–453. ICML (Vol. 98), July)
1998.
[17] K. Rieck, T. Krueger, and A. Dewald. Cujo: E cient detection and preven-
tion of drive-by-download attacks. In Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference (ACSAC), pages 31–39, 2010.
[18] Salvatore Ruggieri. E cient c4. 5 [classification algorithm]. Knowledge and
Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on, 14.2:438–444, 2002.
[19] Steve Sheng, Brad Wardman, Gary Warner, Lorrie Cranor, Jason Hong, and
Chengshan Zhang. An empirical analysis of phishing blacklists. In Sixth Con-
ference on Email and Anti-Spam (CEAS). California, USA, 2009.
[20] K. Thomas, C. Grier, J. Ma, V. Paxson, and D. Song. Design and evaluation
of a real-time url spam filtering service. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pages 447–462, 2011.
[21] Colin Whittaker, Brian Ryner, and Marria Nazif. Large-scale automatic classi-
fication of phishing pages. In NDSS, volume 10, 2010.
39
References
[22] Xindong Wu, Vipin Kumar, J. Ross Quinlan, Joydeep Ghosh, Qiang Yang,
Hiroshi Motoda, Geo↵rey J. McLachlan, and et al. Top 10 algorithms in data
mining. Knowledge and Information Systems, 14(1):1–37, 2008.
[23] G. Xiang, J. Hong, C. Rose, and L. Cranor. Cantina+: A feature-rich machine
learning framework for detecting phishing web sites. ACM Transactions on
Information and System Security (TISSEC), 14(2):21, 2011.
[24] L. Xu, Z. Zhan, S. Xu, and K. Ye. An evasion and counter-evasion study in
malicious websites detection. Technical report, arXiv preprint arXiv:1408, 1993.,
2014.
[25] Li Xu, Zhenxin Zhan, Shouhuai Xu, and Keying Ye. Cross-layer detection of
malicious websites. In Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Data and
application security and privacy, pages 141–152. ACM, 2013.
40
Appendix: Class Diagrams
Figure 6.1: Feature Extraction Classes
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Figure 6.2: Data Processing Classes
42
References
Figure 6.3: Classification Classes
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Figure 6.4: System Architecture
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